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10101101: Is this sequence of digits voice or data? To a computer,
voice is a sequence of digits and data is a sequence of digits. The law has
defined 10101101 to be data, and 10101001 to be voice communications.
Courts have constructed a distinction between data, 10101101, and voice,
10101001. However, that distinction is blurred when voice and data are
simultaneously transmitted through the same medium. The courts forbid
third parties to tap or monitor voice communications, yet permit data
packets to be tracked, stored, and sold by third parties with the implied
consent of either party engaged in the transaction. Prior to the
convergence of voice and data into a single transmission medium, courts
were able to enforce the distinction between voice and data
communications by constructing the clickstream data exemption to the
Wiretap Act. With the onset of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and
comparable technologies, the privacy rights assigned to 10101101 (data)
or 10101001 (voice) have been blended such that it is unclear whether
voice communications using VoIP are protected.
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This Article examines VoIP communications in the modem digital
arena. More specifically, the Article suggests a new legal framework for
courts to analyze VoIP claims brought under the Wiretap Act. Part I of
this Article provides a comprehensive overview of VoIP privacy rights
and legal treatment. Part II sets out a background primer for readers
unfamiliar with Internet technology, including VoIP and clickstream
data. Part III discusses relevant privacy case law, and Part IV describes
how that case law has been applied to electronic communications. Part V
provides a statutory analysis of the different privacy levels that are, and
should be, afforded to different types of electronic communications. Part
VI identifies the specific problem facing the legislature and courts
regarding the treatment of VoIP. To solve this problem, Part VII
proposes a modified framework advocating legislative action to re-write
the Wiretap Act by creating an explicit clickstream data exception with a
corresponding decrease in the mens rea element from intent' to
recklessness for persons using clickstream data. By adopting this
approach, the legislature would enable companies to legitimately tap
clickstream data with or without an end-user's consent, though
companies doing so would be required to design systems that monitor
only clickstream data and do not tap protected oral telephone and
electronic communications. In this way, Congress can protect VoIP
privacy expectations while maintaining the vitality of the Internet
economy.
I. OVERVIEW OF VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL PRIVACY RIGHTS
This section examines the judiciary's treatment of clickstream data
when applying the Wiretap Act's consent exception. By broadly
construing the consent exception in data mining2 cases to include implied
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a) (2004).
2. The term data mining is defined as the process of identifying understandable correlations
and patterns in data obtained from an organization's systems. See H. M. Chung and P. Gray, Special
Section: Data Mining, 16 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 1 at 11-17 (1999). Data mining extends traditional
data analysis and statistical approaches to incorporate analytical techniques drawn from a range of
fields, including but not limited to numerical analysis, pattern matching, genetic algorithms, and
neural networks. See Balaji Rajagopalan & Ravindra Krovi, Benchmarking Data Mining Algorithms,
J. DATABASE MGMT., Jan.-Mar. 2002, at 13, 25-36. Data mining focuses on either modeling
relationships between different types of data or identifying unusual patterns of behavior, such as
spending habits for fraud protection. Id. While the term data mining is used rather broadly, it focuses
on the activities involved in extracting information from data and primarily helps organizations
discover important information about data stored on their systems. Halbert White, A Reality Check
For Data Snooping, 68 ECONOMETRICA 5, 1097-1126 (Sept. 2000). Internet companies utilize data
mining to construct and identify consumer trends, patterns, and profiles. This data is collected in a
variety of ways using multiple channels. Data collected from the Internet, however, primarily utilizes
clickstream data. See discussion infra Part I.B. This paper examines one type of data mining: that of
clickstream data. Other data mining programs, such as spyware and adware, collect different types of
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consent where no explicit contract provision limits the scope of
interceptions, courts have essentially exempted clickstream data from
protection under the Wiretap Act.3 An examination of congressional
intent supports the clickstream data exception, but neither Congress nor
the judiciary has affirmatively recognized this.4  The judiciary has
officially acknowledged the difference in treatment between clickstream
data and other electronic communications, 5 but unless courts clarify this
ambiguity, there is a risk that (1) the clickstream data exception could be
eliminated, making a large amount of Internet communications illegal,6
or (2) the courts could read the exception too broadly, exempting
electronic and VoIP telephone communications from protection under
the Wiretap Act.7
To rectify this judicially created privacy dichotomy, Congress
should amend the Wiretap Act to codify the judicially recognized
clickstream data exception 8 and to lower the mens rea element from
intent9 to recklessness for companies that knowingly risk making
unauthorized third party interceptions of VoIP l° communications while
engaging in judicially protected data mining of clickstream data. The
first of these changes would legalize the interception of clickstream data
under the Wiretap Act with the implied consent of the computer user or
the Web host. At the same time, interceptors of clickstream data would
be forced to operate with due care to prevent unauthorized interceptions
of other telephone and electronic communications transmitted through
the same medium.l"
Justice Brandeis was correct in 1928 when he anticipated that
technological advancement would enable the Government to employ
information using different technical tools and sources, which differ notably from those of cookie-
driven technology.
3. While most people would expect all the aforementioned communications to be protected, the
courts have created a judicial exception by exempting clickstream data from the Wiretap Act. For
example, a DSL line permits voice communications to travel on it as an analog signal, while e-mail
and VoIP are packetized at the source. When the composite signal gets to the central office, the
signal is disassembled, packetized if it was not voice or data, and transmitted to wherever it needs to
go. This process applies as well to sending a fax or using an Internet dial-up connection on a
telephone line, both of which are digital communications over a voice band. The courts have
permitted the tapping of clickstream data but have created various privacy levels for the types of
communications discussed above.
4. See discussion infra Part 111.
5. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19-22 (Ist Cir. 2003); In re DoubleClick,
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503-504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
6. See discussion infra Part V.A.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.
8. See discussion infra Part IlI.C.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 251 i(1)(a) (2004).
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See discussion infra Part VII.
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surveillance tools extending far beyond wiretapping.12 In his dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis asserted that
Fourth Amendment protections must be interpreted broadly to safeguard
against new abuses that were not previously envisioned.' 3 Thus, Justice
Brandeis sought to protect the individual's "right to be let alone" without
regard to the different technologies that might be employed by the
government to compromise that right.' 4 Justice Brandeis's focus on
underlying privacy interests presents a more compelling perspective than
the premise of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196815 (hereinafter "Wiretap Act") as currently applied by the
courts. 16
The courts forbid third parties to tap or monitor oral telephone
communications, 17 but they routinely permit data packets18 to be tracked,
stored, and sold by third parties with the implied 9 or explicit 20 consent of
either party engaged in the transmission. In the digital age, however, the
law-made distinction between voice and data has become muddled. With
the convergence of oral and data communications into a single
transmission medium, the courts are unable to distinguish between oral
telephone and electronic communications. 21 The use of VoIP and similar
technologies has made this legal distinction impossible to uphold
12. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466, 472-74, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (majority holding that a wiretap not effected through a trespass onto private property did
not violate the Fourth Amendment); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution:
Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611 (1968).
13. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
14. Id.; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (finding privacy right in penumbra of Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
interpretations-were privacy as such specifically envisioned, it would not need such circuitous
explanation).
15. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1968).
16. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding a warrantless government
recording of defendant's conversation in an enclosed public phone booth unconstitutional).
18. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994
(D. Minn. 2003) ("Congress also differentiated between 'telecommunications services,' which may
be regulated, and 'information services,' which like the Internet, may not.").
19. See Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 409 (2nd Cir. 2004); Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874, (9th Cir. 2002); Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
497, 503-504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 204 F.R.D. 460,
465 (C.D. Cal. 2001); U.S. v. Pierre-Louis, No. 00-434-CR-GOLD/SIMON, 2002 WL 1268396, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2002); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL
34517252, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct 9, 2001).
20. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19-22 (1st Cir. 2003); Dyer v.
Northwest Airlines Corporations, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (D. N.D. Sep 08, 2004); Freedman v.
America Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Va. Jul 12, 2004); Directv, Inc. v. Spokish,
No. 6:03-CV-680-ORL-22DAB, 2004 WL 741369, at *3, 17 (M.D. Fla. Feb 19, 2004).
21. See Vonage, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1000-03.
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because oral telephone and electronic data communications now travel
over the same wires simultaneously, encapsulated in digital data
22packets.
VolP 2 3 is a technology for transmitting ordinary telephone calls
24over the Internet. In other words, VolP can send oral, fax and other
information over the Internet, rather than through the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) or regular telephone network.25 For
example, if you are connected to the Internet, you can simultaneously
exchange data, audio or video with anyone while using VolP, which is
impossible with a regular telephone line.26 This convergence of separate
mediums shifts the legal landscape of digital communications and
requires further examination. This examination must proceed in light of
the disparity in judicial treatment between oral telephone and electronic
data communications, with oral telephone communications generally
receiving a higher level of privacy protection. 27
VolP is no longer a fledgling technology; 28 it is rapidly becoming a
mainstream communication product. 29 Both corporate and individual
consumers are using VolP to reduce their phone bills by capitalizing on
their existing connections to Internet broadband infrastructure. 30 For
example, Nissan North America, based in California, is implementing
VolP globally, 3' though dollar cost savings are not the only factor
driving this decision. 32 Nissan and a multitude of other companies are
utilizing VolP to facilitate global communication between their offices
22. See FROST & SULLIVAN, VOIP EQUIPMENT 2003 WORLD MARKET UPDATE (2003) (stating
that companies selling IP telephony equipment generated more than $1 billion in revenues in 2000
and expect those revenues to exceed $14 billion by 2006).
23. Use of Internet Protocol data connections that have traditionally been carried over the
public switched telephone network to exchange voice and fax data.
24. See Vonage, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
25. Vo1P EQUIPMENT 2003 WORLD MARKET UPDATE, supra note 22.
26. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY (1999).
27. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that electronically
listening to telephone conversations constitutes a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment), with United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999)
("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that
connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.").
28. See Peter Grant, Ready for Prime Time: A New Internet-Based Phone Technology Has an
Un-Catchy Acronym: VOIP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2004, at R7. Growth projections for VolP vary
widely, but the Wall Street Journal reported in early 2004: "By the end of this year, about 20% of the
new phones being shipped to U.S. businesses will use VolP technology, according to Yankee Group,
a technology consulting firm based in Boston. By 2007 that figure should exceed 50%, and
eventually almost all of the new phones shipped will use VolP. Yankee Group predicts." Id.
29. VOIP EQUIPMENT 2003 WORLD MARKET UPDATE, supra note 22.
30. See Stan Gibson, VoIP Passes Nissan Road Test, EWEEK, Jan. 24, 2005, at 33.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Id.
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because VoIP offers improved functionality over traditional telephone
systems.33 While large corporations that purchase VoIP systems to
improve functionality 34 and decrease costs35 receive the primary benefit
from these services, individual consumers also benefit from Internet-
based VoIP services that offer less expensive long distance and local
phone service via their own home broadband Internet connections.36
VoIP cost savings arise37 from the ability to transmit oral and data
communications simultaneously over the same medium, 38 thereby
eliminating the need for multiple phone and data lines in a home 39 or
business. VoIP technology threatens to break the oral communication
monopolies held by the regional Bell companies 40 because it eliminates
the need for consumers to pay non-competitive fees for the use of a
telephone line to carry oral telephone conversations. 4 1 VoIP transmits
oral communications via Internet Protocol (IP) 42 instead of the PSTN.
Unlike the PSTN,43  VoIP is unlikely to face legal issues of
monopolization and significant government regulation because there are
multiple technologies such as satellite, wireless, cable, DSL, and IP over
33. According to PC Magazine, VoiP can save small businesses significant amounts of money,
averaging about 30 percent on phone costs and larger companies can save on calls to and from
teleworkers or partners-even if they are located in another country-when those calls are placed
over the Internet. C. Wolter, VoIP: The Right Call, PC MAGAZINE, Jun. 22, 2004.
34. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., THE STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IP
COMMUNICATIONS, (2001), at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/neso/vvda/iptl/cnvrg_
wp.htm (last visited Jul. 21, 2005).
35. See Kevin Tolly, VolP: Neither Panacea Nor Pariah, NETWORKWORLD, Feb. 18, 2002, at
24, available at http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/2002/0218tolly.html (last visited Jul. 21,
2005).
36. See Press Release, Infonet, Infonet Introduces Software Tool to Demonstrate ROI for
Converged Networks (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.infonet.com/about/newsroom/
press release.asp?month=l I 13&year-2001 (last visited Jul. 21, 2005).
37. Paul Taylor & Peter Thai Larsen, Time Warner Cable Plans Big Push Into Internet-Based
Phone Services, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al.
38. See Internet Engineering Steering Group, Interet Architecture Board, IETF Policy on
Wiretapping, RFC 2804, INTERNET ENG'G TASK FORCE (May 2000) (discussing how VolP uses the
Intemet's open network architecture and stating that VolP and Interet communications transmit on
a single interconnected digital network).
39. By the end of 2006, more than half of all 110 million-odd households in the U.S. will likely
have the option of getting phone service from their cable companies. By 2008, cable companies will
be selling phone service to 17.5 million subscribers, compared with 2.8 million at the end of 2003,
according to an estimate by research firm Yankee Group. Peter Grant, Here Comes Cable .
WALL ST. J. Sept. 13, 2004 at R4.
40. See Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribution of
Control Over Content, 22 TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY 3, at 183-97 (1998).
41. See Grant, supra note 39.
42. See In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
43. Benkler, supra note 40, at 190.
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power line technology competing to be the communication service
provider.4 4
While the market's invisible hand has already fostered technical
innovations making some VoIP services superior to those offered by the
traditional PSTN,45 the legislature and the courts have yet to resolve two
primary legal issues that are likely to hinder the United States' adoption
of VoIP as the new oral communication standard. First, VolP will have
to contend with the extension of Congressional legislation from the
PSTN to VolP carriers 46 to tax the transmission of data47 and to regulate
communication networks and line monopolies.48 Second, the degree of
44. Grant, supra note 39.
45. See, e.g., David Sheff, Betting on Bandwidth, WIRED, Feb. 2001, at 144-56.
46. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 defines two important categories:
"Telecommunications Services" which are subject to mandatory Title 11 regulation, 47 U.S.C. §
153(46) (1996), and "Information Services" which are exempt from such regulation. 47 U.S.C. §
153(20) (1996). The regulatory classification of a service is of extreme importance to incumbents
and new entrants. For example, the Supreme Court recently upheld the F.C.C.'s initial classification
of cable-modem service as an information service, In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to
the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4821-22, (2002), while classifying
DSL as a telecommunications service. In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24011, 24030-31 (1998). See National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Intemet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005). The Court
reached this decision by agreeing that the F.C.C's cable-modem was reasonable, id. at 2710, after
applying the second step in the Chevron test. Id. at 2708-09. To assess reasonableness, the Court
examined the attributes of an information service under 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2004) (generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making information available
via telecommunications-in this case, browsing the Web to transfer files via FTP and to access e-
mail) vis-A-vis those of a telecommunication service under 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2004) ("the
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received."). National Cable &
Telecommunications Association, 125 S. Ct. 2688 at 2710.
Strikingly, VolP contains attributes of both an information service and a telecommunication
service. The VolP "stack" certainly stores, transforms, and converts information via
telecommunications, so it is an information service. See Phillip Carden, Building Voice Over 1P,
NETWORK COMPUTING, May 8, 2000. The purpose of all this storing, transforming, and converting,
however, is really to transparently transmit voice information to and from a user and another point of
his choosing, all the while minimizing observable differences in the form or content of the
information. VolP providers are graded on how closely they emulate POTS, with the test being "will
your Mom notice?" See, e.g., Sam Schechner, Smooth Operators: Which Internet phone service is
best?, SLATE MAGAZINE, June 29, 2005, available at http://slate.com/id/2121742 (last visited July
13, 2005).
Whether VolP services will be classified as a telecommunications service will eventually
depend on whether the F.C.C. considers VolP a transparent transmission of information. See
National Cable & Telecommunications Association, 125 S. Ct at 2696-97. Note that the F.C.C. did
not consider cable-modem service to be "transparent" because cable-modem service includes DNS
resolution and caching. Id. at 2698.
47. Congress' decisions to tax and regulate VolP technology are beyond the scope of this
paper.
48. See generally Declan McCullagh, Congress Proposes Tax on All Net, Data Connections,
Jan. 28, 2005, available at http://news.com.com/Congress+proposes+tax+on+all+Net,+data+
connections/2100-1028_3-5555385.html (last visited July 20, 2005).
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privacy, if any, that the law will afford to VoIP oral communications
must be defined. 49 The taxation issue lies entirely in the hands of a
legislature that is actively attempting to extend PSTN taxation to IP
communications networks. 50 The privacy issue, however, will likely be
determined, at least initially, by courts integrating VoIP communications
into the oral communications 51 legal structure.
Under the current legal framework, unauthorized third-party access
to oral telephone communications made from the privacy of one's home
constitutes an invasion of any non-consenting person's privacy. 52 Courts
will probably extend these privacy rights to VoIP communications
53
because the Supreme Court has recognized oral communication privacy
rights within the context of the home.54 Because it is physically
transmitted in the form of digital data packets over the Internet,55 VoIP
oral communications, though essentially indistinguishable from Internet
49. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) ("The sanctity of the home is not to be disputed"); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 754 (1984) (noting sanctity of the home); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (use of electronic eavesdropping equipment to overhear conversation inside
telephone booth intrudes on legitimate expectation of privacy); see also Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (describing body and home as "areas afforded the most stringent
Fourth Amendment protection"); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (also describing body and home as "areas afforded the most stringent
Fourth Amendment protection").
50. See generally McCullagh, supra note 48.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2004).
52. See cases cited supra note 49; United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding a violation of the Act required that interception occur contemporaneously with
transmission). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l) (2004), stating: "Except as otherwise specifically
provided in this chapter any person who - (a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic
communication..."
53. See cases cited supra note 49; United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 1983)
(reasonable expectation of privacy in parents' home when defendant had lived there for 20 to 25
years, kept his clothes there, and came and went freely; second defendant had reasonable expectation
of privacy in home when he frequently stayed as guest and came and went freely), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984). Upwards of 90% of Internet users are
concerned about threats to their personal privacy when they use the Internet. See Alan F. Westin,
Personalized Marketing and Privacy on the Net: What Consumers Want, PRIVACY & AM. Bus.,
Nov. 1999, at 11.
54. See cases cited supra note 49; United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir.1983)
(holding that a visitor had legitimate expectation of privacy in the home after spending a couple of
days and nights with unfettered access to the house), rev'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
See also In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 518-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that the Wiretap Act includes a defense of consent by either party to the communication and
the courts have found no unlawful interception of communications had occurred in either of these
cases because the courts found that the consent of the Web portal entity was sufficient in itself to
authorize a third-party to usurp their information).
55. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000-
03 (D. Minn. 2003).
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data communications, are legally protected by a constitutional right of
privacy preventing third parties from tracking, tapping, storing or selling
the communications. 56 VolP opens a paradigm of oral privacy, which
will place a considerable strain on the existing judicial canons protecting
oral and data communications. This legal privacy dichotomy poses a
substantial risk that parties legitimately monitoring Internet data streams
will unlawfully monitor constitutionally protected private VoIP
communications.57 It remains to be seen whether this strain will be
severe enough to force courts to extend the same Constitutional privacy
right to data communications that it is currently extending to oral
communications.58
II. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
This section presents a broad overview of the technology involved
in both Internet voice and data transactions. It discusses how VoIP
transmits voice communications over the Internet, and provides an in-
depth analysis of the inner workings of clickstream data and how it
interacts with cookie technology.
A. Phone Conversations Using VoIP
VoIP allows oral communications to be transferred from circuit-
switched networks to or over Internet Protocol networks, and vice
versa. 59 VoIP transforms standard oral telephone signals into compressed
data packets that are sent over the Internet. 60 At this point, the audio
signal is captured either by way of a microphone or received from line
input. 6 1 This analog representation is then converted to a digital
representation at the audio input device. The resulting digital samples are
copied into a memory buffer in blocks of frame length. Here, a silence
56. See Bartnicki v. Voppe, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (noting that the application of the Wiretap
Acts' prohibitions against intentional disclosure of illegally intercepted cell phone conversations to
media defendants violated First Amendment).
57. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a
third-party data mining company had explicit consent to monitor non-personally identifiable
information, but did not have explicit consent to monitor personally identifiable information, such as
social security number, last name, phone, and date of birth).
58. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
59. For one overview of the emerging market for VoIP, see Grant, supra note 28, at R7.
60. See UYLESS BLACK, VOICE OVER IP (1995).
61. See International Telecommunication Union Telecom Standards, ITU-T Recommendation
H.225.0 (1998), Call Signaling Protocols and Media Stream Packetization for Packet Based
Multimedia Communication Systems, available at http://www.itu.int/home/ (last visited July 22,
2005).
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detector decides whether the block is silence or a portion of speech.62
Prior to transmission over the Internet, the block itself is written to a
socket. Once this is completed, the communication is transmitted to
another VoIP terminal. This terminal examines the header information
and the block of audio is decoded applying the same codec and the
samples written into a buffer.63 Next, the block of samples is copied from
the buffer to the audio output device.64 The audio output device converts
the samples from digital to analog and outputs the signal.65 VoIP can be
used with either a telephone or a PC as the user terminal.66 This results in
different modes of VoIP operation: PC to PC, PC to telephone, telephone
to PC, and telephone to telephone (via the Internet). All VoIP protocols
are application layer protocols.67
Wiretapping dangers increase considerably in the VoIP world. To
eavesdrop over the switched telephone network, there must be physical
access to the telephone line and access to some type of hardware device
that may or may not be very sophisticated.68 To eavesdrop on VoIP no
62. Based on the detector's evaluation as to whether or not the block is part of talk, it is
encoded with the selected codec, then header information is added to block. Id.
63. See generally Philip Carden, Building Voice over IP, NETWORK COMPUTING, May 8, 2000,
available at http://www.networkcomputing.com/netdesign/I 09voipfull.html.
64. See generally Dain Woods, Connecting to the Voice World, NETWORK COMPUTING, April
17, 2000.
65. See Jon-Olov Vatn, IP Telephony: Mobility and Security 20 (2005) (Doctoral Thesis in
Teleinformatics, Stockholm, Sweden).
66. See Rachael King, Home of the Future, TELEPHONY, June 6, 2005, at 10.
67. Carden, supra note 63. An application layer protocol is a layer used to transmit Internet
communications existing within the TCP/IP framework. The application layer is defined within the
TCP/IP protocols, which are an industry standard group of protocols through which computers find,
communicate, and access one another over a transmission medium. Id. The protocol group is
implemented in the form of a software package known as a TCP/IP stack, which splits the
transmission into a number of discrete tasks. Id. Each layer corresponds to a different form of
communication. Id. The TCP/IP architecture has four layers: application, transport, Internet, and the
physical layer. Id. The transmission of voice communications over the Internet initiates with data
being sent from the application layer down the stack to physical layer, where it is then transmitted to
the receiver and goes up the stack in the reverse order, ending at the application layer. Id.
68. VoIP is a solid technology, however: it requires government regulation to ensure a certain
level of product reliability and safety for the consumer. See Yumi Nishiyama, Collective Action in a
Complex Environment: The Case Study of Network Security in Telecom/IT Convergence (2003)
(unpublished Master's thesis) (on file with author). Up until today, the users have seen security
issues in the data and voice worlds as completely separate. With the advent of VolP users are now
exposed to the risks of sending data over the Internet while simultaneously having the expectation
that telephone conversations are between the parties involved. Id.
VolP is vulnerable because convergent technologies lead to weakness from multiple points.
See id
In addition, VolP must address the security holes in cell phones that arise from the transport
mechanisms used when mobile phones are used. Id. Adjoining these problems is the reality that cell
tracker tools have evolved and people can eavesdrop with much greater ease on cellular
transmission. Id. Also, hackers can intercept data with greater ease than before when the data travels
in soft zones (unprotected) between legitimate users and cell towers. See M. Miettinen, IT-Security
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physical tapping is necessary, and the equipment or software needed,
though much more sophisticated, is still within the reach of a sixteen
year old hacker. Data-sniffing tools69 are readily available, and will soon
be enhanced to include the new VoIP protocols.70 Corporations are at
especially great risk. In an office environment, VolP traffic travels over a
data network that is used by all of the regular users of the corporate
LAN. 71 Therefore, any or all of the conversations traversing a network
could theoretically be compromised by anyone with a regular connection
on the network. 72 VoIP packets could be identified and stored for re-
assembly to be played back at a later time.73 The idea that only Internet
traffic is at risk is simply wrong.74 Privacy for oral communications
could be vastly enhanced by the use of encryption,75 though most
corporate networks do not encrypt VoIP calls.76
One of the attractive features provided by VoIP is the ability to
locate intelligence at various points in the network. Gatekeeper or call-
manager devices, which authenticate users and establish connections,77
in the Automobile Domain, LEHRSTUHL FOR KOMMUNIKATIONSSICHERHEIT, RUHR UNIVERSITAT
BOCHUM (Germany), available at http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/mjmietti/seminaariS03/
automobilesecurity.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005). Thus, transmitting information in digital form
raises new vulnerabilities and digital devices can be used either for fiscal or and privacy violations.
Also, as the VolP systems run on vulnerable software, they must contend with all of these possible
holes. Id.
69. Data-sniffing tools are used primarily to steal or transmit end-user data from end-users'
machines with or without their knowledge. P. J. Bruening and M. Stephen, Spyware: Technologies,
Issues, and Policy Proposals, 7 J. INTERNET L. 9, 3-8 (2004). Advertisers can use these tools to
identify what sites end-users have visited and deliver targeted ads to the end-user's computer. Id. For
example, if a user visits a Florida cruise site followed by a later visit to a golfing site, advertising
using data-sniffing tools will serve advertisements to the end-user's computer about golf course
vacations in Florida. Id. Data-sniffing tools encompass cookie technology, spyware, and adware.
70. See J. Daniels, Scumware.biz Educates About Dangers ofAdware/Scumware, 5 COMPUTER
SECURITY UPDATE 2 (2004).
71. Local Area Network: a network of interconnected computers such as an office work-group.
72. See Dale J. Long, The Lazy Person's Guide to Voice Telephony-Part 11, CHIPS, Spring
2004, at 43.
73. See Amie J. Singer, Debate Over Voice-Over Internet Protocol Benefits: Cost-
Effectiveness, Security Concerns at Heart of Uncertainty, 22 SAN DIEGO Bus. J. 19 (Dec. 2001).
74. See Ian Shepherd, The Maturity of Internet Telephony Technology Opens Up Network
Safety Concerns Voice Over IP: Finding a Balance Between Flexible Access and Risk of External
Attack, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Apr. 19, 2005, at 34.
75. Encryption and decryption are CPU intensive and take time. If the overall latency of a
VoIP call is greater than approximately 250m/sec the quality of the call will be noticeably affected.
See Philip Bednarz, Security Considerations at Forefront of VolP Design, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at 63.
76. See Nishiyama, supra note 68.
77. A gatekeeper is an optional component of an H.323 enabled network that provides central
management and control services. See generally K. Percy and M. Hommer, Tips From the Trenches
on VolP, NETWORK WORLD 48 (Jan. 27, 2003). Gatekeepers usually deliver the following in relation
to VolP services: (1) address translation; (2) bandwidth management; and (3) routing functionality.
Id. H.323 is a technical standard that enables VolP companies to create interoperable Internet
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can physically reside on any server 78 on the network. This is really a two-
edged sword. Logging information about user calls may be useful for
billing or tracking purposes, but these logs can also become targets for
hackers. If this type of information is compromised, it can create serious
concerns for organizations or individuals.79 Unfortunately, the home user
is usually unaware of any of these vulnerabilities when that user
purchases or uses VolP technology. 80
B. Clickstream Data and Internet Commerce
This section examines both the technical capabilities and the uses of
clickstream data, examining in detail the role played by cookie
technology. Cookies are information packets transmitted from a server 81
to an end-user's Web browser, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer or
Mozilla Firefox, which then retransmits information back to the server
each time the browser accesses its Web page.82 Cookies usually store
information used for authentication, identification or registration of an
end-user to a website. 83 This information enables the end-user's Web
browser to maintain a continuous relationship between the end-user's
computer and the server of a specific site.84
telephony solutions. Michele Rosen, The Maturing of the Internet Telephony Market, ENT, Mar. 18,
1998, at 48.
78. A server is a computer system or a set of processes on a computer system providing
services to clients across a network.
79. See Edwin Mier, Randall Birdsall & Rodney Thayer, VolP Security Wares. Breaking
Through IP Telephony, NETWORK WORLD, May 24, 2004, at 83, 84-88.
80. See generally Mike Lee, Beware! Bugs Can Attack Net Phones: They May be Cheap but
They are Also Vulnerable to Hackers, Say Experts, Who Advise Installing Anti-virus Patches, THE
STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), August 22, 2004; Jay Fitzgerald, Team to Tie Net Phone Hackers:
Industry Aims to Stop Scams Before They Start, BOSTON HERALD, April 26, 2005, at 31.
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. See Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23
NOVA. L. REV. 551, 554 (1999) ("The data trail, known as transactional data, left behind as
individuals use the Internet is a rich source of information about their habits of association, speech,
and commerce. Transactional data, click stream [sic] data, or 'mouse droppings,' as it is alternatively
called, can include the Internet protocol address ('IP address') of the individual's computer, the
browser in use, the computer type, and what the individual did on previous visits to the Web site, or
perhaps even other Web sites.").
83. Once a user has accessed a Web site that uses cookie technology or an affiliated site, the
embedded cookie on the hard drive begins collecting data about the user's Web activities. In four
reported cases, Web sites used cookie technology to mine personal information from the users'
machines. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Intuit Privacy
Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155
(W.D. Wash. 2001).
84. Many privacy advocates believe that this automatic transmission of information should not
occur absent a requirement of active consent, or "opting-in," by the end-user. See Shaun B. Spencer,
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 910 (2002); see
generally, Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
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Cookies 85 were first used in the mid-1990s when Web based
businesses began using them to deliver user-specific solutions for each
machine that accessed their Web pages.86 Cookies allowed websites to
track end-user activities by placing electronic tracks or markers on an
end-user's machine.87 Collectively, these cookie-driven markers create a
trail of information commonly referred to as "clickstream data.",88
Clickstream data is used because centralized Web server
technologies cannot store and sort the vast amounts of data required to
authenticate a user or to deliver the respective web solutions to each
individual user of a site.89 Thus, Web sites off-load certain information to
the end-user's device where it is stored in cookies. 90 These cookies
provide the Web site with a mechanism through which to collect and
store data on the storage device of the visitor's machine, thereby
enabling a Web site to record, track, monitor, and generate customized
dynamic pages reflecting the stored data.91
Initially, clickstream data was used to gather basic information
from a Web user,92 such as the type of computer an individual used to
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1458-60 (2001); Lawrence Jenab, Comment, Will the
Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th
Congress, 49 KAN. L. REV. 641, 667-68 (2001); Rachel K. Zimmerman, Note, The Way the
"Cookies " Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 459-60 (2000); but see Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 87, 113-117 (2001).
85. For further discussion of cookie technology, see In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502-
03 ("Cookies are computer programs commonly used by Web sites to store useful information...").
86. A sampling of Web sites that use cookie technology is as follows: www.yahoo.com;
www.google.com; www.wamu.com; www.schwab.com; www.ibm.com. Adjoining these web sites
is a slew of intranet and Web applications that utilize cookies and clickstream data for
authentication. Not only will business be impacted, but so will a large number of government
enabled Web applications. Some government sites using this technology are mentioned at
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/587/1/71?TopiclD=l (last visited March 30, 2005). See
also U.S Census Bureau, Retail E-commerce Sales for the Fourth Quarter 1999 Reach $5.3 Billion,
U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE NEWS, Mar. 2, 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/nrts/
www/current.html (last visited March 30, 2005).
87. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 82.
88. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 82.
89. See generally MOELLER, R. A., DISTRIBUTED DATA WAREHOUSING USING WEB
TECHNOLOGY (2001).
90. See MICHAEL J. A. BERRY & GORDON S. LINOFF, MASTERING DATA MINING: THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT (Robert M. Elliott ed., 2000); Colin
Shearer, The CRISP-DM Model: The New Blueprint for Data Mining, J. DATA WAREHOUSING, 13-
22 (2000).
91. See generally JIAWEI HAN & MICHELINE KAMBER, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND
TECHNIQUES (Jim Gray ed., 2000); B. Rajagopalan and R. Krovi, Benchmarking Data Mining
Algorithms, J. DATABASE MGMT., Jan.-Mar. 2002, at 13, 25-36.
92. See generally Survey: A Key Technology for Online Profitability, FIN. TIMES (London),
April 3, 2002, at 5; see generally Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, A Model of Web Site
Browsing Behavior Estimated on Clickstream Data, J. MKTG. RES., August 2003, at 249.
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access the Internet, the type of Internet browser utilized, and the
identification of each site or page visited.93 As technology evolved,
however, so did clickstream data. 94 Today, when an individual discloses
certain information during a visit to a website via their Personal Digital
Assistant (PDA), cell phone, Blackberry, laptop computer, iPod, or
desktop computer, it is possible that the website will be collecting
clickstream data of a much more personal nature.95
The functionality of the data mining industry and most web portals
would be severely limited, if not rendered useless, in the absence of
clickstream data or cookies.96 Although it is possible for authentication
processes to be retooled so as to require users to log in or to affirmatively
consent to monitoring by cookies or clickstream data tracking, it is
highly unlikely that fully informed end-users would interact with sites
that track, monitor, and perhaps sell their personally identifiable
information. 97 Internet companies currently rely heavily on tracking
clickstream data to deliver customized services and advertisements to
Internet users.98 For example, DoubleClick, an Internet advertising
company, stockpiled over 100 million user profiles by 2002. 9 9 Since
then, the technology and ability to profile users has greatly improved and
Internet companies now rely on clickstream data more than ever before.
Because Web-enabled applications that utilize clickstream data in either
a direct or derivative form are so prolific--cell phones and PDAs are just
93. See Fusun Feride Gonul, Stereotyping Bites the Dust: Marketers No Longer Focusing On
Demographic Profiling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, February 26, 2002, at B3; Karen Dearne, You
are Being Monitored Online, THE AUSTRALIAN, September 24, 2002, at 31.
94. Clickstream data is a trail of information that a user leaves behind while browsing on the
Web. Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKLEY TECH.
L.J. 1085, 1104 (2002). See generally Herbert A. Edelstein, Pan for Gold in the Clickstream,
INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, Mar. 12, 2001, at 77-91; IAN H. WITTEN & EIBE FRANK, DATA MINING:
PRACTICAL MACHINE LEARNING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES WITH JAVA IMPLEMENTATIONS (Diane
D. Cerra et al. eds., 2000); Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Consumer?
The Emerging Law of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Consumer Data, 56 BUS. LAW. 213,
234-35 (2000). Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition (v 0.9.5), defines
clickstream as "a series of mouse clicks made by a user of the Internet, esp. when logged and
analyzed for marketing research; the virtual record of an Internet user's activity including every Web
site and every Web page visited and how long the user was at each," available at http://dictionary.
reference.com/search?q=clickstream (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
95. This information could be passwords, e-mail addresses, credit card numbers, medication,
stock trades, and other sensitive information that your machine stores. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc.
Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2003).
96. The operations of many commercial and secure websites depend on cookies and
clickstream data interception. For a sampling of those impacted, see supra note 86.
97. See Special Report-Online Marketing: Traffic control, PRECISION MARKETING, March 18,
2005, at 17.
98. See In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503-507 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Berry & Linoff, supra note 90.
99. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
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the beginning-if the courts construe the Wiretap Act to protect
clickstream data in the same way as it protects "electronic
communications,"'100 the business world and government functions alike
will be disrupted. 10 1 To demonstrate this expansive reliance on cookie
technologies, simply view the cookies stored on your own computer.'2
III. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF VOICE, MAIL,
AND INTERNET-BASED COMMUNICATIONS
When people step outside of their homes, their expectation of
privacy diminishes because their actions are exposed to the public
view. 103 When people write letters or place telephone calls from within
the privacy of their own homes0 4 they expect heightened privacy
protection despite using semi-public means of communication.,0 5 While
oral telephone conversations t1 6 and first class mail1 0 7 are protected on an
equal footing with actions that occur within a person's home, 08 human
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2004).
101. But see FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N., 106TH CONG., PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, at 7, 10-20, 29-33, 38 (F.T.C. Rep. 2000),
(recommending that Congress enact legislation requiring websites to ask users' permission before
collecting personal information), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/
privacy2000.pdf (last visited July 22, 2005).
102. An end-user can view all of the cookies stored on a local machine using Intemet Explorer
by following these steps: (1) open Interet Explorer; (2) select "Internet Options" under the "Tools"
menu; (3) click on the "General" tab and click the "Settings" button; (4) click the view files button;
(5) sort files by type by clicking on "Type"; (6) find documents of the type labeled "Text
Document." To see the information stored by the cookie in its raw and likely unintelligible format,
double-click on one of these text files containing "cookie" in its file name.
103. See United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1983) (legitimate expectation
of privacy in home which one owns and in home which ones shares with others), rev'd on other
grounds, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1983)
(reasonable expectation of privacy in locked safe located in defendant's residence; defendant had
standing to challenge search of safe although he denied ownership of drug transaction ledgers seized
from safe during search), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
104. See generally Jeremiah Courtney, Electronic Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and Your Right
to Privacy, 26 FED. COMM. B.J. 1 (1973); JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, THE LAW OF
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (West 2001).
105. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1970) (discussing the close
relationship between free speech and the search of first-class mail); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
733 (1877) ("Letters and sealed packages ... in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and
inspection ... as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.").
106. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2004); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(holding that electronically listening to telephone conversations constitutes a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
107. See cases cited supra note 105.
108. See ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. at 732-34.
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and machine-written cyberspace communications are not, and receive a
lower level of protection under the law.'0 9
A. Telephone Communications are Protected
from Governmental Privacy Invasions
Telephone communications are protected from governmental
privacy invasions in two principal ways."10 First, parties to a voice
conversation are entitled to a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under
the Supreme Court opinion of Katz v. United States."' Second, the
Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 prevents unauthorized third-party
interceptions of telephone communications, unless the interceptor has a
court order or the consent of either party involved in the conversation." 2
The Katz opinion explains the rationale behind the Supreme Court's oft-
quoted statement that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places," '"13 and concludes that an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy must be protected from government searches." 4 The Federal
Wiretap Act was Congress' response to the Katz opinion and was an
attempt to prevent electronic surveillance of oral telephone
communications without a court order." 15
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz disposed of the long-
standing idea that property rights governed a person's right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures." 6 Katz stands for the
proposition that an individual can control which of his actions and
information is accessible by the public," 7 and what remains private and
protected by the Fourth Amendment." 8 The Court found that, while
people assume certain risks whenever they communicate, the risks
109. See Paul Frisman, E-Mail: Dial 'E'for 'Evidence, 'NEW JERSEY LAW J., Dec. 25, 1995, at
12 (commenting that ECPA provides more protection for phone calls then for e-mail); see also
United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("Cyberspace is a nonphysical
'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that connects millions of users,
defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.").
110. See Frierson v. Goetz, 227 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896-97 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (describing a two-
part test for determining qualified immunity).
111. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
112. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2004).
113. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
114. Id. at 353 (government's actions "violated the privacy upon which [petitioner] justifiably
relied" and thus triggered Fourth Amendment protections).
115. See United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1990); S. REP. No. 90-
1097, at 66-72 (1968); 1968 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 2110, 2153-2159.
116. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
117. See id. ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he Seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
118. Id. at 352.
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change once electronic surveillance enters the scene, and individuals lose
all sense of security and privacy, even when the door is closed.1 9 The
Katz doctrine of Fourth Amendment protections has a twofold
requirement: first, a person must exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy, and second, that expectation must be one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.12 0 Although courts have read Katz quite
narrowly in recent years,121 most people would agree that expecting
privacy while at home, on the phone, or in a letter sent via first class mail
is reasonable. 122
Since the Fourth Amendment's privacy protections only insulate
individuals from governmental privacy encroachments, 123 the Wiretap
Act is the main cause of action protecting telephone communicants from
non-governmental third-party interceptors.1 24 Telephone communicants
can obtain redress under the Wiretap Act for unauthorized third party
interceptions of telephone communications unless the interceptor has a
court order 125  or the consent of either party involved in the
conversation. 126 Courts may award triumphant plaintiffs actual damages
plus any profits made by the violator resulting from the violation, 127 or
statutory damages of the greater of $100 per day for each day of
violations or $10,000.128 Punitive damages 129 can be awarded for wanton,
reckless or malicious violations.130 Finally, successful plaintiffs may be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees. 131
119. Id. at 351-53.
120. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case For Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 852 (2004) (stating that "despite Berger and
Katz, courts have proved surprisingly reluctant to find that the occasional holes in the Wiretap Act
violate the Fourth Amendment"). Moreover, "wiretapping law may be constitutional in theory, but it
is statutory in practice ... When wiretapping occurs inside the United States, courts generally refuse
to construe the Fourth Amendment as going beyond the scope of the Wiretap Act." Id. at 853.
122. Thus, a person who makes efforts to keep his words private is "entitled to assume that the
words he utters.., will not be broadcast to the world." Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
123. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (stating that
"although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one,
effected by a private party on his own initiative, the Amendment protects against such intrusions if
the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government"); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2004).
125. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2004).
126. 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 1(2)(d) (2004).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(a) (2004).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(b) (2004).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(2) (2004).
130. See Bess v. Bess, 929 F.2d 1332, 1335 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d
515, 520 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979)).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3) (2004).
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B. The Legal Treatment of Non-Oral
Internet Communications and E-Mail
While Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act (hereinafter "Wiretap Act") 3 2 initially afforded extensive
protection to wire communications, oral communications were protected
only when there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. 133 Because the
legislation covered both face-to-face oral communications and traditional
point-to-point wired communications, courts were faced with myriad
interpretive difficulties.' 34 To correct the problems with Title III,
Congress amended the Wiretap Act by passing the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). 135 Congress designed the
ECPA to prohibit the intentional interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications.136  Because Congress was concerned with
advancements in electronic technology that would be capable of
defeating any privacy expectations, 37 the ECPA enacted a strict set of
standards for the interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications.' 38 Congress further expanded the protection of wireless
communication by passing the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), which extended Title III to the radio
portions of cellular and cordless phones. 39 In the wake of September 11,
2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act). 140 The Patriot Act contained a
number of important changes to Title III that expanded the government's
ability to conduct surveillance.' 4'
132. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. U1, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1968).
133. See United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527 (11 th Cir. 1993) (stating that Congress
drafted the definition of "oral communication" to reflect the Supreme Court's standards for
determining when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists).
134. See Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La.), affd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.
1986) (treating radio telephone communications as oral communications and holding that because
communications through cellular devices could easily be intercepted, the requisite reasonable
expectation of privacy did not exist).
135. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-
2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1986)).
136. See S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-3557.
137. Id. at 3555.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2004).
139. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2004)).
140. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
141. The scope and impact of the Patriot Act is beyond the scope of this paper. See John P.
Elwood, Prosecuting the War on Terrorism: The Government's Position on Attorney-Client
Monitoring, Detainees, and Military Tribunals, 17 CRIM. JUST. 30, 51 (2002).
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1. Non-Oral Internet Communications
Like "wire communications,"' 142  Internet communications are
protected from unauthorized third-party interceptions as "electronic
communications" under the Wiretap Act. 143 Internet communications,
however, do not receive the same level of protection as do oral
communications under a Fourth Amendment privacy rights analysis.
1 44
Decisions addressing this topic have focused on an expectation of
privacy in two categories: (1) information knowingly passed online to
other Web users, 145 and (2) information voluntarily passed offline to ISPs
when signing up for Internet service. 46 Both lines of authority conclude
that, under Katz, Internet users lack legitimate expectations of privacy in
data, either because the information is knowingly exposed to public view
or because Internet users assume the risk that the intended recipient will
share the information with others. 1
47
Courts have employed the knowing exposure and the assumption of
the risk rationales to deny expectations of privacy in electronic
information voluntarily exposed online, such as Internet postings. 148 For
instance, courts have found that Internet users lose their expectations of
privacy in personal information that is voluntarily disclosed to an ISP.
149
In United States v. Hambrick,150 a district court noted that the Internet, a
"computer and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis" under Katz.15  However, "[s]o
142. "Wire communications" are defined by the Wiretap Act as the following:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such
connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2004).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
144. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("Cyberspace is
a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that connects
millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.").
145. See In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
146. See Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
147. See In re Toys R Us, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Hambrick, 55 F.
Supp. at 508.
148. See Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
149. Id.
150. Id. ("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone
network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. So long as
the risk-analysis approach of Katz remains valid, however, this court is compelled to apply
traditional legal principles to this new and continually evolving technology.").
151. Id.
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long as the risk-analysis approach of Katz remains valid ... court[s] [are]
compelled to apply traditional legal principles to this new and
continually evolving technology."'' 52 In applying the Katz risk-analysis
approach to the defendant's motion to suppress ISP sign-up information
obtained by law enforcement, the Hambrick court found that, absent a
specific non-disclosure agreement, the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy because he knowingly revealed his personal
information to the ISP and all of its employees. 53
Under the current jurisprudence, courts are likely to conclude that
Web users lack a legitimate expectation of privacy based upon two
rationales. First, users lack a subjective expectation of privacy in their
data packets, excluding those containing any VoIP communications.15 4
Second, any actual expectation of privacy is objectively unreasonable
since users assume the risk that their data will be disclosed to law
enforcement. 55 While courts apply the Katz risk analysis approach to
both oral telephone and Internet-based communications, the public
nature of most Internet communications prevents courts from finding that
Web users have reasonable expectations of privacy when communicating
through these means. 56
2. E-mail
As with other Internet communications, e-mail communications are
protected from unauthorized third party interceptions while in
transmission as "electronic communications" under the Wiretap Act.
Unlike other Internet communications, e-mail is considered to retain a
legitimate expectation of privacy while in transmission.' 57 This
expectation of privacy, however, evanesces once the e-mail is received
and read by another person.' 58 Courts analogize e-mail to postal mail,
and hold that the sender assumes the risk that the recipient will disclose
the contents of the e-mail to law enforcement. 59 Because e-mail is often
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See generally In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 16-21 (1 st Cir. 2003).
155. Id.
156. It is, however, conceivable that a court could find a reasonable expectation of privacy for
an instant messaging conversation between two users that does not occur in a public forum and
where the users do not realize that the contents of their communications are stored on a central
server.
157. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 634-35 (E.D. Penn. 2001)
(finding that e-mail in transit is protected under the Wiretap Act).
158. See id. at 114.
159. See Lois R. Witt, Terminally Nosy: Are Employers Free to Access Our Electronic Mail?
96 DICK. L. REV. 545, 548-53 (1992) (discussing the exemptions and unequal treatment of the
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stored electronically on a server before being read by the recipient, e-
mail communications are also protected by the Stored Communications
Act, which protects communications that are electronically stored from
being intercepted or altered. 60
C. The Legal Treatment of Clickstream Data
Courts have treated clickstream data as an exception to the Wiretap
Act by broadly inferring consent between Web businesses and third-
party data mining companies that intercept users' personal
information. 161 The data can then be monitored and recorded by prying
eyes and mined for information that is used to profile a Web user or to
recreate her online experience. 162
Courts have primarily dealt with clickstream data in Chance,'63
Pharmatrak, 164  Intuit, 165  Toys R Us, 166  and DoubleClick, 167 where
plaintiffs alleged violations of the Wiretap Act for the use of cookie
technology to intercept clickstream data.' 68 The outcome of each of these
ECPA); Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap
Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 239-41 (1994).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2004).
161. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511 (S.D.N.Y 2001)
("Although the users' requests for data come through clicks, not keystrokes, they nonetheless are
voluntary and purposeful. Therefore, because plaintiffs' GET, POST and GIF .submissions to
DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites are all 'intended for' those Web sites, the Web sites' authorization
is sufficient to except DoubleClick's access under § 2701(c)(2).").
162. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Mine Your Own Business!.: Making the Case for the Implications of the
Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 1,
4 (2002-2003); see also U.M. Fayyad et al, From Data Mining to Knowledge Discovery: An
Overview, ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 6 (1996).
163. See Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156-57 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
164. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). The ECPA
provides for a private right of action versus one who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a) (2004).
165. See In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
166. See In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
167. See In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503-504 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
168. Spyware, although somewhat difficult to define, is a generic class of software security
threats with malicious intent that includes technologies such as keystroke logging, malware,
homepage hijacking, and adware. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Special Report on 'Phishing," Criminal
Division (2004) (unpublished article), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/
Phishing.pdf. The hallmark of spyware is its installation on a user's computer without his or her
knowledge, consent or permission while connected to the Internet. It can be transferred via spam
emails or be contained in freeware, shareware or games downloaded from the Internet. Id.
Unsuspecting users may even consent to the installation of spyware with the click of a mouse in
agreement to an application or program's licensing terms and conditions. See Federal Trade
Commission, National and State Trends in Fraud and Identity Theft, CONSUMER SENTINEL (Feb. 1,
2005), at 1, available at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Topl0Fraud2OO4.pdf. The dangers
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cases relied entirely upon the Wiretap Act, and examinations of
reasonable expectations of privacy under Katz were cursory at best. 1
69
Recently, however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Pharmatrak1
70
has reduced the effects of this judicially created exception by stipulating
that consent can only be inferred where there is actual notice and where
one party actually consents to the interception.'
7 1
In dealing with clickstream data172 and cookie-related technology,
the Second and Ninth Circuit district courts in DoubleClick 73  and
Intuit,174 respectively, construed the Wiretap Act's consent exception
broadly, 75 requiring only implied consent, whereas the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Pharamatrak176 narrowly construed the exception
requiring actual consent. 17 In these cases, the courts heard Wiretap Act
claims brought by plaintiffs alleging unauthorized third party access to
communications. 7 8  In all three cases, end-users conveyed digital
information to second-party entities that then used the information to
construct user profiles in a process commonly referred to as data
mining.17
9
of spyware include its ability to: (1) track a user's online activities without the user's knowledge or
consent; (2) steal a user's personal information from his or her computer; (3) track a user's each and
every keystroke (including the entry of password and financial information); (4) hijack homepages
and substitute unacceptable sites; (5) create an endless stream of pop-up ads; (6) change computer
settings (such as changing a user's default homepage settings); (7) disable hardware and software
computer settings; (8) drastically slow infected computers; (9) remain on a user's computer in spite
of attempts to uninstall it; and (10) result in hard drive corruption. Id.
169. The Supreme Court has historically applied a two-part test to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment protects an asserted privacy interest. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351-53 (1967) (announcing a test to determine expectations of privacy). First, the individual must
exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation must be "one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 361; United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 122-23 (2d
Cir. 1984) (applying two-part test), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 846 (1984).
170. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19-22 (1 st Cir. 2003).
171. Id. "Without actual notice, consent can only be implied when the surrounding
circumstances convincingly show that the party knew about and consented to the interception."
(Quoting Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir.1998)). Moreover, "knowledge of the
capability of monitoring alone cannot be considered implied consent." (Quoting Watkins v. L.M.
Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
172. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 n.14 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
173. See id. at 500-505 (discussing cookies and the collection of data, where the plaintiffs
again did not prevail).
174. See In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
175. See id. at 1278; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04.
176. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266-68 (D. Mass. 2003).
177. See id. at 19-22.
178. See Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155-57 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04; In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 12; In re Toys R Us, Inc.,
Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); In re Intuit,
138 F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
179. Definitions are problematic in the data mining field, as every writer uses the terms
differently. The term "data mining" is used in two distinct ways: both to define the entire process
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Both the Intuit' 80  and DoubleClick1 81 courts permitted Web
businesses to intercept clickstream data utilizing cookie technology,
thereby extracting personal information off users' machines. 1 2 The
defendant Web businesses placed cookies on end-users' computers,
which then transmitted personal information back to the website's owner
or to a third-party data mining company. 83 The courts did not find that
there had been a violation of the users' privacy rights in either case;184
rather, both courts found that the Web businesses' unilateral consent was
sufficient to authorize third-party usurpation of user's personal
information using cookie technology.1 85 Both courts found that the third-
party data mining companies did not violate the Wiretap Act under 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) because they were given implied consent and
because their actions were not conducted for tortious or illegal
purposes. 186
In contrast, the Pharmatrak8 7 court challenged the sweeping
implications of the implied consent argument established in
DoubleClick8 8 and Intui1 89 by requiring the consenting party to both
know about and consent to interceptions before consent can be
inferred. 90 The Pharmatrak court found in favor of the Internet users,
holding that neither party to the communication consented to the web
monitoring company's interception of personally identifiable
information.1 9' The court reasoned that "[w]ithout actual notice, consent
can only be implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly
and to describe the specific stage in which the algorithms are applied. See generally Joseph S. Fulda,
Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 105 (2000).
180. See In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
181. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04.
182. See id. at 505 n.14; In relntuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
183. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04; In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
184. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514-515; In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1278-79.
185. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 518-520; In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
186. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 518-520; In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
187. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19-22 (1 st Cir. 2003).
188. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 518-520 (holding that the Wiretap Act includes
a defense of consent by either party to the communication and that the courts have found no
unlawful interception of communications had occurred in either of these cases because the courts
found that the consent of the Web portal entity was sufficient in itself to authorize a third-party to
usurp their information).
189. See In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
190. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 20 (stating that "[w]ithout actual notice, consent can
only be implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show that the party knew about
and consented to the interception" (quoting Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).
Moreover, "knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be considered implied consent"
(quoting Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (1 1th Cir. 1983)).
191. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d 9, 19-22.
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show that the party knew about and consented to the interception."'' 92
Where the parties had an explicit contract limiting the permissible scope
of the interception to non-personally identifiable data, 193 the court
refused to find implied consent between the parties to collect personally-
identifiable information that clearly exceeded the bounds of the express
contract. 194 The Pharmatrak95 requirement of actual consent represents a
stricter stance on inferring consent than is taken in Intuit'96 and
DoubleClick.197 However, even under this construction, end-users never
input all of the written information transmitted by cookie via clickstream
technology over the Internet; thus, the courts have imputed consent by
reasoning that end-users and their computers are the same entity. By
limiting courts' abilities to infer consent to situations where actual
consent has been obtained, 198 the Pharmatrak holding took a major step
towards eliminating the judicially created clickstream data pseudo-
exception under the Wiretap Act. 199 If this trend continues, courts may
eliminate the clickstream data exception on their own by requiring either
explicit or implicit actual consent for all third-party clickstream data
interceptions under the Wiretap Act, including those data sent by end-
users' machines without any end-user input.
IV. THE LEGAL SETTING OF VOIP COMMUNICATIONS
In the existing judicial environment, it is not clear whether VoIP
communications will receive similar judicial treatment as oral telephone
communications 20 or whether they will be treated as Internet based
electronic communications. 20 1 The Wiretap Act's protective provisions
apply equally to oral, wire, and electronic communications. 20 2 In
192. See id. at 20.
193. See id. at 19-22.
194. Id. at 21. Nevertheless, Pharmatrak collected personal information on a subset of users
and distributed 18.7 million cookies via the Netcompare technology framework. Id. at 15.
195. See id. at 21.
196. See In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
197. See In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
198. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19 (stating that "consent may be explicit or implied, but
it must be actual consent rather than constructive consent").
199. Id.
200. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (stating that "(w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." (citation omitted)). Since it is possible that both the
computer and the VolP phone used by the communicants are within a home, their dialog should be
protected as well.
201. See discussion supra Part 11.
202. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) ("The basic purpose of the Title Ill is
to 'protec[t] the privacy of wire ... and oral communications."') (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66
(1968)).
[Vol. 29:1
2005] VoIP & the Wiretap Act
practice, however, courts have permitted the interception of Internet
electronic communications under the Wiretap Act more than
interceptions of oral telephone communications because (1) corporate
web portals using clickstream technology frequently consent to the
interception of end-user data for purposes of data mining, whereas
telephone users rarely consent to third-party interceptions of telephone
conversations; 20 3 (2) end-users are more likely to consent to interceptions
of Internet electronic communications in return for increased online
functionality than they are when engaging in traditional telephone
conversations ;04 and (3) Internet electronic communications are more
likely to be stored on an end-user's computer, making them fair game for
third-party interceptors, since the Wiretap Act only applies to
communications intercepted contemporaneously with transmission.
20 5
203. See Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding
that "[i]t is implicit in the web pages' code instructing the user's computer to contact Avenue A,
either directly or via DoubleClick's server, that the web pages have consented to Avenue A's
interception of the communication between them and the individual user"); In re DoubleClick, Inc.
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that "the DoubleClick-affiliated
Web sites are 'parties to the communication[s]' from plaintiffs and have given sufficient consent to
DoubleClick to intercept them").
204. A telephone communicant need not give express consent to authorize an interception
under the Wiretap Act; such consent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See United
States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that consent can be inferred where
circumstances indicate that a party knowingly agreed to surveillance), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021
(1988). However, inferring consent under the Wiretap Act for a telephone communication requires
the party to have knowledge or notification, without which consent cannot be implied. See In re
State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235, 1266 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that Plaintiffs claim
under the Wiretap Act established sufficient evidence of an absence of either knowledge or
notification to prevent the court from implying consent to the interception of a telephone
communication).
205. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that for
a Web site to be "intercepted" in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during
transmission, not while it is in electronic storage).
VoIP transmits in real time, offering comparable services to the traditional telephone. See
Philip Carden, Network Design Manual: Building Voice over IP, NETWORK COMPUTING, available
at http://www.networkcomputing.com/netdesign/I109voipfull.html (last visited July 12, 2005). As
with telephone communications, VoIP interceptors will usually be intercepting the communications
contemporaneously with transmission. See Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, & David Wagner,
Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11, SEVENTH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MOBILE COMPUTING AND NETWORKING, (July 2001); see also NIKITA BORISOV,
IAN GOLDBERG, AND DAVID WAGNER, SECURITY OF THE WEP ALGORITHM, available at
http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html (last visited July 13, 2005). Unlike telephone
communications, VoIP communications can be intercepted prior to post transmission while stored or
cached on servers or end-users' computers. See FBI Protests VolP Approach, Jan. 9, 2004, available
at http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?site-lightreading&doc id45695. Possibly, the courts
will hold that such interceptions do not violate the Wiretap Act because the communications were
not intercepted contemporaneously with transmission. Id In some situations, however, these VoIP
interceptions may be prohibited by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2701 (2004), or the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2004).
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Currently, courts permit data tapping when actual consent is given
by either party to the data transaction and the interception is not done for
a criminal or tortious purpose . 6 VoIP communications are a hybrid type
of communication, combining traditional telephone communication with
Internet data transmission.20 7 Even if courts treat VoIP as oral telephone
communication as opposed to Internet data communication, scenarios
will likely arise, such as in the case of spyware,2 °8 where courts may
infer actual consent to interceptions of VoIP or other Internet electronic
communication based on the willful use of spyware with notice of its
capabilities, or a broad contractual consent agreement included in the
spyware's end-user license agreement.20 9
This dichotomy in legal treatment between Internet
communications and oral telephone communications is exacerbated in
the realm of governmental surveillance because courts afford Fourth
Amendment privacy protection to oral telephone communications 2 1° yet
do not extend this protection to Internet electronic communications.211
Courts have held that oral telephone communicants are entitled to a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" for telephone conversations
conducted in private. 21 2 Courts, however, have refused to recognize a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in Internet electronic
This Article's solution advocates that the legislature amend the Wiretap Act to prevent data
mining companies from intentionally or recklessly intercepting VoIP conversations in transmission
while they are legally mining other clickstream data. See discussion infra Part VII.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (2004); see also Sussman v. American Broadcasting Companies,
Inc., 186 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant journalists
who eavesdropped on telephone conversations. The court reasoned that "[u]nder section 2511, the
focus is not upon whether the interception itself violated another law; it is upon whether the purpose
for the interception-its intended use-was criminal or tortious . ), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1131
(2000).
207. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993,
995 (D. Minn. 2003) ("Voice over Internet Protocol ('VoIP') ... allows customers to place and
receive voice transmissions routed over the Internet .... Voice communication using the Internet has
been called Internet Protocol ('IP') telephony, and rather than using circuit switching, it utilizes
'packet switching,' a process of breaking down data into packets of digital bits and transmitting them
over the Internet."). See also State ex rel. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 824 N.E.2d
68, 70 (Ohio 2005).
208. New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
209. Id. See also Benjamin Adelman, Gator's EULA Gone Bad, at http://
www.benedelman.org/news/l 12904-1.html (last visited July 13, 2005).
210. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (use of electronic eavesdropping
equipment to overhear conversation inside telephone booth intrudes on legitimate expectation of
privacy).
211. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("Cyberspace is
a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that connects
millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.").
212. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (use of electronic eavesdropping equipment to overhear
conversation inside telephone booth intrudes on legitimate expectation of privacy).
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communications 213 reasoning that, as the Internet is public in nature,
communications therein should receive a disfavored privacy protection
214status. Some Internet communications, however, such as e-mail, are
afforded a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Fourth
Amendment 215 because they can be analogized to a letter placed in the
postal mail, which is afforded privacy protection under the Fourth
Amendment. 216
Like oral telephone communicants, VoIP communicants can
personally record their own dialogue 21 7 or can contract their privacy
rights away to a third party, such as Vonage, that can record and resell
the dialogue.21 8 Today, this technology is being used in corporate voice
mail systems, enabling companies to eavesdrop on any oral telephone
conversations saved on the company's VoIP network server. 219 These
conversations are often not protected by the Fourth Amendment or the
Wiretap Act because employees consent to the interception in their
employment contracts, leaving them with no reasonable expectation of
220privacy.  While the courts have recognized exceptions to absolute oral
213. See Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508 ("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very




216. See cases cited supra note 105.
217. See Sussman v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 186 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Wiretap Act permits interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications to
which that person is party, unless the communication is intercepted for purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000).
218. See generally Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 290 F. Supp.
2d 993, 994 (D. Minn. 2003). While the technology to catalogue and store oral communications is in
its infancy, hypothetically it will develop given its market potential once most corporate entities
begin using VoIP systems. Id. See also STEVEN TAYLOR, DISTRIB. NETWORKING ASSOC., INC., 2004
VOIP STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT (2004), at http://www.webtorials.com/abstracts/
VoIPSurvey2004.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
219. See, e.g., Dan McIntosh, E-monitoring@workplace.com: The Future of Communication
Privacy in the Minnesota Private Sector Workplace, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 539, 549 (2000)
(describing the Business Use, Consent and Provider exceptions to the ECPA and stating that "the
exceptions have been applied favorably to employers and thus, have posed significant hurdles to
employee claims under the ECPA that allege unlawful interception or access of workplace
communications"). See also Konrad L. Trope & Paula K. Royalty, Current Legal Issues
Surrounding the Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol, 16 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 10, 11, (2004)
("Some companies like MetaSwitch and Cisco Systems, Inc., have already cooperated with the FBI's
request for CALEA compliance to make their VolP hardware products 'surveillance friendly.' These
two companies have 'developed backdoor technology in their VolP products that enables the FBI to
eavesdrop at will."').
220. See, e.g., United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a professor had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his work computer when the university
had a written computer policy stating that it reserved the right to "view or scan any file or software
stored on the computer or passing through the network"); see also Dir. of Thrift Supervision v. Ernst
& Young, 795 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. D.C. 1992) (finding that employees and partners of accounting firm
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telephone communication privacy rights for interceptions that occur with
221 22the consent of a party, in the ordinary course of business,2 2 by a
spouse, 223 or in prison, 224 they do not permit unauthorized third-party
eavesdropping.
VoIP communications should be placed squarely within the realm
of traditional telephone conversations and, because they both use a wire
to enable oral communications, they should be identical in the eyes of the
law.225 The Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications 226 without a court order22 7 unless one of the
228parties to the communication consents to the interception. Under this
reasoning, oral VoIP communications cannot be intercepted without a
court order229 unless one of the parties to the communication actually
consents to the interception. 23 To maintain parity in the Wiretap Act's
protections, courts should refuse to liberally infer consent to the
interception of VoIP communications based on an Internet user's consent
to the interception of Internet data communications in general. If courts
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in work-related diaries kept in their offices for business
reasons).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2004).
222. See Arias v. Mutual Cent. Alarm Servs., Inc., 182 F.R.D. 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(holding that an alarm service company's recording of all incoming and outgoing telephone calls,
including employee calls, did not violate the ECPA since the company's recording of the
conversations was justified by "their legitimate interests in timely provision of emergency services,
ensuring employee fidelity, and protecting themselves against unfounded claims since it intercepted
telephone calls within its ordinary course of business"), aff'd, 202 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2000); but see
Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979) (rejecting an ordinary course of business argument
in a prison monitoring case because the call in question was not routinely monitored and, indeed,
was "an exceptional course of conduct").
223. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544-45 (D. Utah 1993) (stating that "as
long as the guardian has a good faith basis that is objectively reasonable for believing that it is
necessary to consent on behalf of her minor children to the taping of the phone conversations,
vicarious consent will be permissible in order for the guardian to fulfill her statutory mandate to act
in the best interests of the children." The court, however, held that a divorced wife's defense of
consent under the Wiretap Act was inapplicable for public policy reasons because the interceptions
amounted to criminal and civil violations of Utah law, rendering the consent exception
inapplicable.).
224. See United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the routine
monitoring of inmate telephone calls by federal prison authorities was within the ordinary course of
their duties), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2004).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
227. Court ordered surveillance is limited to law enforcement bugs or wiretaps. Section 2518
establishes strict requirements for court authorized interceptions of wire communications. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (2000).
228. 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 i(2)(c)-(d) (2000) (containing consent defenses).
229. Court ordered surveillance is limited to law enforcement bugs or wiretaps. Section 2518
establishes strict requirements for court authorized interceptions of wire communications. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (2000).
230. 18 U.S.C. §§ 251 l(2)(c)-(d) (2000) (containing consent defenses).
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define consent broadly, VoIP communications will become a less secure
means of oral communication than traditional oral telephone
communications, even though they are explicitly protected as "wire
communications" under the Wiretap Act.231
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS
The Wiretap Act's language can be read to support either a broad or
narrow construction of consent, though VoIP's oral nature favors the
narrower. 232 This narrow interpretation is driven by the Supreme Court's
holding in Katz,2 33 where the Court recognized that oral telephone
communications are entitled to a higher level of legal protection based on
the Constitution's Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights.234 Ideally, the
legislature would resolve the judicial ambiguities that have arisen in
interpreting the Wiretap Act by redrafting it235 to distinguish oral
communications whether transmitted over a wire, via a telephone
network, or by VoIP from electronic communications, thereby
addressing the clickstream data exemption. 236
The Wiretap Act's express language categorically includes written
information, but by examining the drafters' intent and applying a little
common sense, one could argue that Congress created a pseudo-
237clickstream data exception. As discussed above, the federal courts
231. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2004).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004). Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications prohibited.
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or
endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral
communication when.
Id.
233. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
234. See supra text accompanying note 12; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466, 472-
74, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (majority holding that a wiretap not effected through a
trespass onto private property did not violate the Fourth Amendment.); Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional
as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611 (1968).
235. The regulatory distinction between oral and data has been derived from the regulatory
objective to cross-subsidize local service and 911 service with the result that interstate service is
heavily taxed and/or levied. Voice over IP is less expensive to use than end-user because it bypasses
most of the taxes and levies. See generally DECLAN MCCULLAGH, CONGRESS PROPOSES TAX ON
ALL NET, DATA CONNECTIONS (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://news.com.com/Congress+
proposes+tax+on+all+Net,+data+connections/2100-1028_3-5555385.html (last visited July 18,
2005).
236. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the appropriate statutory language for the
revised Wiretap Act.
237. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 n.14 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
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have created a clickstream data exception, which permits the interception
of machine-generated Internet data communications under the Wiretap
Act by inferring, on behalf of the transmitting party's computer, actual
consent to the interception of the "electronic communication." 238
Analyzing the Wiretap Act using statutory construction techniques yields
two different lines of argument.239 The first and strongest applies the
plain meaning approach and concludes that the Wiretap Act protects all"electronic communications," including machine-generated Internet
electronic communication, from all unauthorized interceptions. The
statutory language does not support the argument that some but not all"electronic communications" are protected. Analyzing the Wiretap Act
through the plain meaning approach 240 leads to the conclusion that all
oral, written, and electronic communications transmitted over a wire,
without the consent of one of the parties or a court order, are protected.24'
The second interpretation applies the statutory intent technique, 242
arguing that the drafters of the Wiretap Act and its subsequent
amendments intended to distinguish between human and clickstream
data.24 3 This argument has never been directly applied by the courts 244
because the courts have focused on interpreting "consent" to permit the
238. See id. at 511 ("Although the users' requests for data come through clicks, not
keystrokes, they nonetheless are voluntary and purposeful. Therefore, because plaintiffs' GET,
POST and GIF submissions to DoubleClick-affiliated websites are all 'intended for' those websites,
the websites' authorization is sufficient to except DoubleClick's access under § 2701(c)(2).").
239. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 411 (1989) (discussing interpretative rules for regulatory statutes).
240. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (stating
that there is "no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes"); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
490 (1917) ("when words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the
legislative intent").
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
242. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350-51 (1977);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 434 n.Il (1971).
243. S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112 [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 90-1097].
244. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re
Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig.,
No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc.,
165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In each case, the court held that no unlawful interception
had occurred because, even if the transmission to the third party constituted an "interception" of the
user's communications with the Web site, it was done with the consent of the Web site, which was a
party to the communication. But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir.
2003) (finding that there was no consent under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (2004),
where a corporate entity had an explicit agreement prohibiting a third-party from collecting personal
identifiable information).
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interception under the Wiretap Act.245  In Internet electronic
communication interception cases, the courts have read the Wiretap
Act's consent exception 246 broadly by finding implied consent absent any
explicit agreement between the parties to authorize third-party
interception under the Wiretap Act.247 By using this argument, the courts
were able to sidestep the prohibition against third-party interception of
electronic communications supported by the plain meaning of the
Wiretap Act.
Because the two statutory analysis approaches are in direct conflict
with one another, the onset of VoIP compels a reexamination of which
interpretation is most appropriate for the Wiretap Act. This Article
argues that the "plain meaning" of the Wiretap Act establishes
comprehensive statutory protection for all forms of "electronic
communications. ' '248 The legislature, therefore, should either reinforce
this strict prohibition or redraft the Wiretap Act to separate oral249 from
machine-generated Internet electronic communications, thus resolving
the ambiguities that have arisen through judicial interpretation of the
Wiretap Act.250
A. Plain Meaning Analysis Supports Comprehensive Protection
for All Communications Including Clickstream Data and VoIP
The plain meaning approach 25 1 has many formulations, but its
central tenet is that there is no need to interpret unambiguous
language.252 Courts that have applied the plain meaning rule have even
245. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497; In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272; In re Toys
R Us, No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1; Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153. In each case, the
court held that no unlawful interception had occurred because, even if the transmission to the third
party constituted an "interception" of the user's communications with the Web site, it was done with
the consent of the Web site, which was a party to the communication. But see In re Pharmatrak, 329
F.3d at 15 (finding that there was no consent under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d) (2004),
where a corporate entity had an explicit agreement prohibiting a third-party from collecting personal
identifiable information).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2004).
247. See cases cited supra note 244.
248. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2004).
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2004).
250. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the appropriate statutory language for the
revised Wiretap Act.
251. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1483 (1987).
252. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (holding
that there is "[n]o more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes"); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336
(2000)); Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6, 9 (1989) ("[W]e must take the intent of
Congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in Federal District Courts to be that which its
language clearly sets forth" (alteration in original) (quoting Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
2005]
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refused to look at a statute's title.253 In federal courts, the most common
effect of the plain meaning rule is to preclude extensive review of the
legislative history through reports, hearings, and debates.254 The plain
meaning rule denies any need to examine the legislative intent unless the
words are so ambiguous that the plain meaning leads to an absurd
result.2 55
The Wiretap Act's text makes explicit reference to "writing" in
electronic form.256 The literal text of the Wiretap Act applies to both
written and oral communications transmitted over a wire: the prohibited
action is one that "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication." 257
Arguably, these words leave little room for any creative
interpretation. The application of this statutory language to oral
communications includes voice communications utilizing VolP
technology that fall under the protected scope258 of the Wiretap Act as
wire and electronic communications. Also, VolP transmits oral
259communication over a wire, and thus should receive extended privacy
rights according to Kat 260 as discussed above. 261 In summation, the
courts have repeatedly held that where the plain meaning of a statute is
367 U.S. 348, 352 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477,
481 (1st Cir. 1987).
253. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) ("when words are free from
doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative intent"); Hayden v. The Collector,
72 U.S. 107, 110 (1866); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that
the plain meaning of a statute controls unless the language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results).
The title may not be used to add or to take from the body of the statute, but it may be used to assist
in the interpretation of its meaning. Hayden, 72 U.S. at 110. The title of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2511 (2004), is "[ilnterception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications
prohibited." This title is ambiguous as to whether or not electronic communications can be
attributed to both humans and machines, or to solely humans.
254. See, e.g., Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317 (stating that "[h]aving applied the American Plain
Meaning Rule and having determined that there is no ambiguity," the court is not required to answer
Plaintiff's contention that the plain meaning of the statute is inconsistent with Congress' intent).
255. See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) (holding that a court can reject the
plain language interpretation of a statute if such an interpretation would lead to "patently absurd
consequences").
256. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2004) (definition of electronic communications includes
"writing").
257. 18 U.S.C. § 251 (1Xa) (2004).
258. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(a)-(e) (2004).
259. VoIP transmissions can also be transmitted over Wi-Fi. For a general overview, see Joel
Conover, Anatomy of lEE 802.1lb Wireless, NETWORK COMPUTING, Aug. 7, 2000.
260. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
261. See discussion supra Section lIl.A.
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not ambiguous it should be followed as written; 262 therefore the courts
should rigidly enforce the Wiretap Act to prohibit unauthorized
interceptions of wire, oral and electronic communications. 263 Arguably,
however, Congress intended the Wiretap Act to apply only to wire, oral,
and electronic communications generated by humans, thereby exempting
clickstream data.264
B. Intent Arguments Support a Clickstream Data Exception
The plain meaning argument is not dispositive because the Wiretap
Act's legislative history 265 and text 266 both focus on direct inter-human
communications initiated by the parties to the communication,267 thereby
permitting the clickstream data exception.268 "[O]ral communication" 269
privacy is essential for entering into and altering personal, intimate, and
political associations.270 As some jurists have observed, "[n]o one talks to
262. See United States v. Montejo, 353 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (E.D. Va. 2005) (stating that
courts "should not look beyond [the plain meaning] unless there is ambiguity or unless the statute as
literally read would contravene the unambiguously expressed legislative intent gleaned from the
statute's legislative history. Even if the result appears to be anomalous or absurd in a particular case,
the court may not disregard unambiguous language.") (citing United States v. Sheek, 990 F.2d 150,
152-153 (4th Cir. 1993)).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
264. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18 (1986) (stating that "[lIegal protection against the
unreasonable use of newer surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology."
265. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 243, at 2153-54.
266. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
267. Common sense dictates that the Wiretap Act was intended to apply to communications
between humans because computers cannot be held in violation of the Wiretap Act subject to
criminal or civil liability unless they are acting as some persons' agent, including corporations.
Senator McClellan, who co-sponsored Title III, remarked that "[t]o assure the privacy of oral and
wire communications, Title Ill prohibits all wiretapping ... by persons other than duly authorized
law enforcement officers." United States. v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 669 (6th Cir. 1976). This
statement enforces the common sense argument because it plainly states that the statute's focus is on
inter-human communications.
268. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re
Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig.,
No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A., Inc.,
165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In these cases, the courts held that no unlawful
interception had occurred because, even if the transmission to the third party constituted an
"interception" of the user's communications with the Web site, this was done with the consent of the
Web site owner, which was a party to the communication. But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy
Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that there was no consent under the Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d) (2004), where a corporate entity had an explicit agreement prohibiting a third-
party data from collecting personal identifiable information).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2004).
270. See United States v. United States Dist. Court for E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(holding that the President did not have the inherent power to wiretap phones of United States
citizens); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1987) (noting that Massachusetts law
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by electronic surveillance of conversations in the home
unless all of the parties have consented); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001)
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a recorder as he talks to a person., 271 If the plain meaning argument were
correct, and if the Wiretap Act was intended to prohibit all unauthorized
interception of "electronic communications, 272  Internet commerce
would be disrupted because a large number of website operations that
rely upon clickstream data would be unlawful.273 This result arguably
creates an unworkable interpretation, and such an interpretation is not
entitled to deference.274 Thus, the intent of the drafters should be
examined to see if it conforms to the plain meaning construction.275
A strong intent-based 276 counterargument can be made that the
drafters of the Wiretap Act intended 277 "electronic communications" to
include only human-generated communications. 18 U.S.C. §2510(12)
defines "electronic communications" as including "any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire .... ,,278 An argument can be
made that the Wiretap Act's drafters intended it to prohibit unauthorized
interceptions of human "oral" and "electronic communications" in"writing," while exempting machine-generated clickstream data from itsscope.279 When interpreting a statute, it is paramount to determine the
(recognizing the role of privacy in communications in an "uninhibited exchange of ideas" amongst
citizens).
271. See Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 72 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2004).
273. Pitofsky, supra note 101 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1977) ("We
would be justified in probing legislative history if the language were ambiguous or if, even though
unambiguous, the language literally read produced a senseless or unworkable statute.").
275. See Calderon v. Atlas S.S. Co., 170 U.S. 272, 281 (1898) (holding that the intent must be
gathered from the words such that it avoids a result of "absurdity, which the legislature ought not to
be presumed to have intended" (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396
(1868)).
276. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1899)
(refusing to acknowledge a construction ignoring "the spirit of the legislation and carr[ying] the
statute to the verge of the letter and far beyond what under the circumstances of the case must be
held to have been the intent of Congress").
277. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 13 (1986) ("Section 101(a)(2) of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act amends the definition of 'oral communication' in current section
2510(2) of title 18 to exclude electronic communications. There have been cases involving radio
communications in which the court having determined that the radio communication was not a wire
communication then analyzes it in privacy terms to determine if it is an oral communication. The bill
rejects that analysis by excluding electronic communications from the definition of oral
communications. An oral communication is an utterance by a person under circumstances exhibiting
an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying
such an expectation. In essence, an oral communication is one carried by sound waves, not by an
electronic medium.").
278. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2004).
279. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re
Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig.,
No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A., Inc.,
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purpose that should be attributed to it.2 80 In the case of the Wiretap Act, it
is particularly appropriate to consider the drafters' intent281 because the
advancement of new technology has created a great deal of ambiguity
regarding the Wiretap Act's plain meaning.282 The primary objective of
the Wiretap Act is to protect the privacy of human communications; 283
the recognition of the clickstream data exception is necessary so that the
purpose of the legislature is enforced and not subverted.284
The Wiretap Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress
intended the Wiretap Act to encompass instances of third-party
wiretapping of oral, written, and electronic communications. The
legislative history of the original 1967 Wiretap Act and all of its
subsequent amendments focused on human-generated
285communications. In 1967, Congress intended the Wiretap Act to
establish the authority and standards for government wiretaps for
criminal investigations286 and to protect individuals against unauthorized
165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In these cases, the courts held that no unlawful
interception had occurred because, even if the transmission to the third party constituted an
"interception" of the user's communications with the Web site, this was done with the consent of the
Web site owner, which was a party to the communication. But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy
Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (lst Cir. 2003) (finding that there was no consent under the Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d), where a corporate entity had an explicit agreement prohibiting a third-party
data from collecting personal identifiable information).
280. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); see also Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 43-44 n.7-8 (1986) (committee reports are the "authoritative source for legislative intent");
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (the "authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill .... "); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the court should
look no further than the committee reports in examining the legislative history).
281. Title III was amended in December 1986. The Act now sets forth restrictions and imposes
civil and criminal sanctions for the unlawful interception of "electronic communications" as well as
retaining those on "wire" and "oral" communications. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2004).
282. The ECPA was drafted with the intent to provide protection against unauthorized
interceptions in areas of recent technological advancement, e.g., cellular and cordless telephones,
pen registers, electronic mail, etc. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555-57.
283. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
284. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18 (1986) ("Legal protection against the unreasonable use
of newer surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology.").
285. In a Senate report pertaining to Title III, it was stated that "[18 U.S.C. § 251 1(1)(a)]
establishes a blanket prohibition against the interception of any wire communication." S. REP. No.
90-1097 at 2180. The report also stated that the definition of a "person" in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6)
(2004) is "intended to be comprehensive." Id. at 2179.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2004); see also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974)
("The purpose of the legislation, which was passed in 1968, was effectively to prohibit, on the pain
of criminal and civil penalties, all interception of oral and wire communications, except those
specifically provided for in the Act, most notably those interceptions permitted to law enforcement
officers when authorized by court order in connection with the investigation of the serious crimes
listed in § 2516.").
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invasions of their private oral telephone communications via
wiretapping.28 7
In 1986, Congress passed the ECPA,288 which made notable
amendments to the Wiretap Act in order to keep up with technological
advancements. 289 Congress intended the ECPA to re-establish the
balance between privacy and law enforcement that had been upset, to
privacy's detriment, by the development of new communication devices,
computer technology, and changes in the structure of the
telecommunications industry.29 ° In passing the ECPA, Congress
specifically acknowledged "large-scale electronic mail operations,
cellular and cordless phones, paging devices, miniaturized transmitters
for radio surveillance, and a dazzling array of digitized networks., 29 1 The
legislative history suggests that Congress sought to prevent the Wiretap
Act from being gradually eroded as technology advanced.29 2 It is evident
that Congress drafted the ECPA to focus on human communications, not
on clickstream data.293 In addition to the goals of privacy and law
enforcement, the ECPA sought to advance the development and use of
these new technologies and services. 294 Although Congress intended to
encourage the proliferation of new communications technologies, it
recognized that consumers would not trust new technologies if the
privacy of individuals using them was not protected.295
Congress designed the ECPA to provide rules for government
surveillance in the modern age. However, technology has evolved in
unanticipated ways. The interactive nature of the Internet now includes a
multitude of communications, some of which are generated by computers
without the end-user even knowing that they are communicating
296information. In this context, a person's electronic communications
encompass much more today than they would have in 1986.297 Congress'
intent in drafting the Wiretap Act and its subsequent amendments has
287. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
288. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-3127 (2004).
289. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 2 (1986).
290. Id. at 17-19.
291. Id. at 18.
292. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2-3, 5 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 16-19 (1986).
293. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18 (1986) ("Illegal protection against the unreasonable use
of newer surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology.").
294. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) (noting that legal uncertainty over the privacy status
of new forms of communications "may unnecessarily discourage potential customers from using
innovative communications systems").
295. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
296. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("Cookies are computer programs commonly used by Web sites to store useful information ... .
297. See H.R. REP. No. 106-932, at *9 (2000).
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11298 , 299 ,300consistently focused on protecting "oral, wire," or "written"
human communication; because privacy rights apply to people and not
machines, a clickstream data exception is an absolute necessity.3 '
A number of courts have adopted this view.3 °2 In discerning
Congressional intent, courts have concluded that Congress intended to
exempt clickstream data from the Wiretap Act, finding that the
interception of clickstream data30 3 falls outside the scope of the Wiretap
Act's protection. The courts in DoubleClick and Intuit recognized the
existence of an exception for clickstream data because they found
implicit consent where explicit consent was lacking, thereby enabling
third parties to intercept clickstream data. While on its face this
exception violates the plain meaning of the Wiretap Act,30 4 the courts, by
focusing on consent, interpreted the Wiretap Act in the spirit of its
legislative purpose.30 5 When this reasoning is applied to VoIP, it is
possible that neither party will consent to the interception of its
communication, but such an interception would be permissible because
of clickstream technology's indirect role in the facilitation of VolP
communication. 30 6
Further supporting an intent-based approach is the judicial canon
that a statute should always be presumed to be the work of reasonable
men. 30 7 This common sense rule requires the courts to give deference to
an interpretation that is both reasonable and constitutional.30 8 Here, the
intent approach is both reasonable and constitutional because machine
generated clickstream data does not deserve constitutional protection
since it cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The plain
meaning approach would bring the Internet to a standstill because of the
298. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2004).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2004).
300. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2004) (defining electronic communications to include "writing").
301. The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351 (1967). Courts have held that students occupying college dormitories enjoy the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971).
302. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In
re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
303. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04; In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
304. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
305. Sunstein, supra note 239.
306. See discussion supra Section I1 and ll.B.
307. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 350-51 (1977);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 434 n. Il (1971).
308. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) ("When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.").
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Internet's reliance on clickstream technology. 30 9 While not offering an
ideal solution, the statutory intent approach provides a viable solution
until Congress rewrites the Wiretap Act or explicitly acknowledges the
plain meaning interpretation. 310
VI. THE PROBLEM OF CLICKSTREAM DATA
AND CONVERGING COMMUNICATIONS
While the courts have solved the immediate problem concerning
data communications by distinguishing between explicit consent and
pseudo-implicit consent, their solution is untenable. Courts have
recognized that oral telephone and Internet electronic communications
are subject to different levels of privacy rights: oral telephone
communications fall under the umbrella of the Fourth Amendment
construction of "reasonable expectations of privacy ' 31 1 while Internet
electronic communications do not.3 12
Proponents of VoIP technology advocate less stringent regulations
and judicial interference in VoIP than exists today in telephone
technology, 31 3 which, while logical, contradict the intent of both the
314 315Supreme Court and Congress. Between the landmark Katz case and
309. See discussion supra Part II.B.
310. See discussion infra Part VII.
311. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the respondent need not
be at "home," in order to enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy). "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places," id., and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a legitimate
expectation of privacy. Id. at 359.
312. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("For Fourth
Amendment purposes, this court does not find that the ECPA has legislatively determined that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name, address, social security number,
credit card number, and proof of Internet connection. The fact that the ECPA does not proscribe
turning over such information to private entities buttresses the conclusion that the ECPA does not
create a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. This, however, does not end the
court's inquiry. This court must determine, within the constitutional framework that the Supreme
Court has established, whether Mr. Hambrick's subjective expectation of privacy is one that society
is willing to recognize.").
313. See Jeffrey Citron, Presentation at the FCC Forum on Voice Over Internet Protocol (Dec.
1, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.fcc.gov/voip/presentations/citron.doc).
314. In Katz, the Court drew a line between oral statements that are considered private under
the Constitution and those statements that lack constitutional protection. 389 U.S. at 351-53. The
Court properly ruled out the "constitutionally protected area" test, which afforded a bright line, but
an irrational one. Id. at 351.
315. When Congress passed the Wiretap Act, it covered almost all aspects of an intangible
conversation, thereby obviating the complexity that would have arisen if it distinguished between its
various attributes. The Wiretap Act protected the "contents" of communications, but expansively
defined "contents" as "any information concerning the identities of the parties to such
communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(8) (1968). The definition of contents was designed to be comprehensive. See S. REP. No. 90-
1097, at 91 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2179 (defining "contents" to include "all
aspects of the communication").
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the passage of the Wiretap Act, the Court and Congress have sought to
create a zone of oral communication privacy. The Supreme Court in
Katz316  recognized an individual's reasonable expectation to
conversational privacy within the context of his or her own home.
317
Despite this precedent, lower courts have, in data privacy cases, focused
primarily on "consent, 3 18 not on who or what has authored the
information. 319 By electing to focus on "consent, ' 320 the courts have
constructed a lower level of privacy with respect to clickstream data
transmissions 321 which, when applied to Internet voice communications
such as VoIP, contradicts the plain meaning of the Wiretap Act, obviates
the Katz line between protected and unprotected,3 22 and violates an
individual's right to privacy.
Nevertheless, the lower courts' creation of the clickstream data
exception is commendable because it enabled the Internet to flourish.3 23
If the courts had relied only upon the Wiretap Act's plain meaning and
found that the statute was unambiguous, the Internet economy would
have been disrupted.324 Though using the intent approach and creating
the clickstream data exception is not perfect, it is a more appropriate
interpretation of the Wiretap Act given the potential adverse impact of
the plain meaning approach.
VII. SOLUTION
Applying the judicially created clickstream data exception325 to the
Wiretap Act creates a substantial risk that companies and individuals
legally engaged in tracking clickstream data could simultaneously
intercept oral VoIP and other electronic communications, both of which
316. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-353.
317. See id. at 353; United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment clearly protects communications carried by land-based telephone lines). On the
other hand, pure radio communications are afforded no such protection because "[b]roadcasting
communications into the air by radio waves is more analogous to carrying on an oral communication
in a loud voice or with a megaphone than it is to the privacy afforded by a wire." See Goodall's
Charter Bus Serv., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 178 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1981).
318. In four reported cases, cookie technology was used by websites to mine personal
information from the users' machines. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.
2003); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re DoubleClick,
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
319. See discussion supra Part III.C.
320. See cases cited supra note 318.
321. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
322. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
323. See discussion supra Part III.C.
324. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
325. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y 2001).
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are protected by the Wiretap Act.326 The Wiretap Act's high mens rea
requirement of an intentional interception permits the negligent, reckless,
327or knowing interception of communications. This high mens rea
requirement, coupled with the judicially created clickstream data
exception, makes the simultaneous mining of clickstream data and VoIP
communications permissible so long as it is done unintentionally.32 8 By
finding implied consent through the clickstream data exception, the
courts are condoning the interception of both electronic data and oral
VoIP communications that likely fall outside of end-users' authorized
consent if the intercepting parties are acting unintentionally. 32 9 This
creates the all-too-likely scenario wherein third-party interceptors who
are pervasively deploying data tapping technology across the Internet
Protocol network may be simultaneously tapping additional
communications protected by the Wiretap Act as well as constitutionally
protected communications in the case of governmental interceptions.
This unauthorized tapping violates both the statutory intent and plain
meaning interpretations of the Wiretap Act.33 °
The only viable judicial interpretation of the Wiretap Act in the
twenty-first century is the statutory intent approach, which recognizes
that the Act is ambiguous and that Congress intended to exempt
clickstream data.33' Congress can resolve the problem of conflicting
judicial interpretations by creating an explicit clickstream data exception,
with a corresponding decrease in the mens rea element from intent332 to
recklessness, for persons intercepting clickstream data. By lowering the
mens rea element, Congress would be able to protect privacy
expectations in VoIP and all other electronic communications while
continuing to foster the development of the Internet economy.
Adopting this approach would enable companies relying upon the
Internet to continue using clickstream data while simultaneously
compelling these companies to utilize systems that prevent unauthorized
interceptions of protected electronic communications, including VoIP.
326. See discussion supra Part II; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2004).
327. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a) (2004).
328. See discussion supra Part III.C.
329. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2004).
330. The continued adoption of VoIP further exacerbates the problems caused by the
clickstream data exception. VoIP uses some clickstream data when authenticating each party to the
conversation. Thus, data mining companies will, under the current law, be able to intercept VolP
conversations without violating the Wiretap Act as long as they do so unintentionally while they are
legitimately intercepting clickstream data under the Wiretap Act.
331. Although other technology exists beyond cookie-driven authentication, the Internet in its
current state would not support these technologies. Furthermore, the billions of dollars that have
been invested in cookie-based authentication would overnight vanish.
332. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(I)(a) (2004).
[Vol. 29:1
VoIP & the Wiretap Act
Companies using clickstream data would no longer face the uncertainty
of acquiring adequate consent to satisfy the Wiretap Act, though they
would be required to use systems that tap only clickstream data and not
other electronic or oral VoIP communications. Under this innovative
approach, lack of intent would no longer be a viable defense for
companies engaging in unauthorized simultaneous interceptions of
protected oral, wire, and electronic communications. The new law would
require these companies to act responsibly given their privileged
position, and to use technology designed to prevent the unauthorized
interception of other protected communications.
By explicitly recognizing the clickstream data exception, Congress
would resolve the problem of differing consent levels for
indistinguishable electronic communications arising from the
convergence of communication mediums. In so doing, Congress would
close the current consent loophole333 that allows companies mining
consumers' personal information by way of clickstream data to
simultaneously mine other protected communications, while maintaining
the recognition of the legitimate applications of clickstream data in
commerce. 334
CONCLUSION
In both DoubleClick335 and Pharmatrak,33 6 the federal courts
emphasized consent with respect to cookie-driven data mining
technology, commonly referred to as clickstream data. In each case, the
cookies were never fully written by the end-users of the website
themselves,337  but were generated by various algorithms and
technologies to mine personal information from the end user's
computer. 3 8  Since the end-users never input all of the written
information transmitted by the cookie across a wire, the courts imputed
consent by reasoning that end-users and their computers are the same
entity.339 This finding arguably contradicts both the higher expectation of
333. Courts allowed interception of personal information through cookie technology in four
cases: In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Intuit Privacy Litig.,
138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
334. See discussion supra note 86.
335. See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04.
336. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21.
337. See discussion supra Part IIIC.
338. See discussion of data mining supra note 2.
339. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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privacy afforded to oral communications by the Constitution 340 and the
Wiretap Act's prohibition of unauthorized third-party interceptions of
oral telephone and electronic communications.341
In order to ensure that oral communications utilizing VoIP
technology will receive the same treatment and protection under the law
as their non-VoIP oral communication counterparts enjoy, the courts and
the legislature must act. They must either explicitly recognize the
legislative privacy distinction between clickstream data and other oral,
wire and electronic communications irrespective of the issue of consent
as discussed in Pharmatrak and DoubleClick,342 or the courts must halt
all use of data mining technology and wait for Congress to deliver a
legislative solution.343 A Congressional amendment would provide courts
a new legal framework in which to analyze VoIP claims brought under
the Wiretap Act, enabling them to differentiate between data
transmissions and other oral, data, and electronic transmissions. Without
Congressional action and court application, VoIP technology remains at
risk of unauthorized access and mining, which threatens the free
communication of us all.
340. See supra text accompanying note 27; compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (holding that electronically listening to telephone conversations constitutes a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment) with United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.
2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) ("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a
computer and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis.").
341. See supra text accompanying note 52. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2004) ("Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who - (a) Intentionally intercepts,
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral or electronic communication .... "); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001)
(describing body and home as "areas afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection");
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing
body and home as "areas afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection"); Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
810 (1984) (stating that "the sanctity of the home is not to be disputed"); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 750, 754 (1984) (noting sanctity of the home); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658
(5th Cir. 1976) (holding a violation of the Act required that interception occur contemporaneously
during transmission); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (use of electronic eavesdropping equipment overhear
conversation inside telephone booth intrudes on legitimate expectation of privacy).
342. See discussion supra Part II,
343. See discussion supra Part VII.
